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Abstract 
Language development in infants is a 
dynamic process that involves the 
emergence and  increase of consciousness, 
with which built-in learning mechanisms 
make infants’ imitation and interaction with 
their surroundings  become socially 
meaningful. Taking Gao & Holland’s (2008, 
2013) statements of levels of consciousness 
for language development as the theoretical 
guideline, this study proposes a rule-based, 
signal-processing agent-based model to 
explore the dynamics of language 
development in early infants. In this model, 
we assume that an infant’s rule-based 
learning behaviors can be featured by 
different levels of consciousness and that its 
adaptation processes can be explained in 
relation to levels of consciousness. In this 
paper we will discuss properties of 
consciousness at different levels and 
identify the influencing factors for reaching 
them. Our ultimate goal in building up the 
model is to understand the processes of 
language development with an approach 
that can better reflect reality. 
1 Introduction 
Understanding how language is acquired by infants 
has remained to be a challenging task. Previous 
attempts, such as the behavioral approach (e.g. 
Skinner, 1957; Roediger, 2004; Ramscar & Yarlett, 
2007), relational frame theory (e.g. Hayes et al., 
2001), nativist theories (Chomsky, 1967, 1975), 
social interactionist theories (Bruner, 1983; 
Carpenter et al., 1998; Tomasello, 2003), etc. all 
have achieved remarkable results that have shed 
light on future directions in research in child 
language acquisition. 
More recent views emphasize that child language 
emerges through imitation and social interaction 
with the support of built-in learning mechanisms 
(Tomasello & Bates, 2001; Tomasello, 2003; Snow, 
1999; MacWhinney, 2004; Bates & Goodman, 
1999). For example, emergentist theories, 
represented by MacWhinney's competition model 
(1986), argue that language acquisition emerges 
from the interaction of biological pressures and the 
environment through a cognitive process. These 
theories emphasize that nature and nurture need to 
be jointly involved to trigger the language learning 
process.  
In psychology, Jean Piaget’s experimental 
studies on cognitive development revealed stage-
development in children. Children’s speech was 
discussed in terms of thought and reasoning (Piaget, 
1926). Following Piaget, psychologists and 
linguists (e.g. Bowerman, 1990, 2004; Bates, 1975, 
1999; Bates & Goodman, 1997, 1999; Mandler, 
2004, 1998) made data-based assumptions that there 
could be many learning processes involved in 
language acquisition. Evolutionarily, some wired-in 
help supplied by a long evolutionary history is 
assumed to exist in supporting this task. For 
example, infants can imitate facial gestures between 
12 and 21 days of age, an age much earlier than 
predicted by stage development theory (e.g. Piaget). 
Such imitation implies that human neonates equate 
their own behaviors with gestures they see others 
perform (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Meltzoff & 
Borton, 1979; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). But how 
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does the newborn go on from there to make sense of 
the torrent of novel input? In particular, how does 
the newborn travel the long distance from very 
limited initial abilities to full language acquisition? 
Although we have large collections of relevant data, 
we have little theory of the dynamics of this process. 
These questions remain to be answered (Gao & 
Holland, 2013). 
Our objective of this study is to apply the agent-
based model (Holland, 1995) to explore language 
development in early infants. Our approach has 
substantial differences from the previous attempts. 
We will take Gao & Holland’s (2008, 2013) 
statements of levels of consciousness (LoC) for 
language development as the theoretical guideline 
to build up a model that can reveal the dynamics of 
language development in early infants. By 
incorporate development observations into a 
theoretical framework, we will illustrate the 
mechanisms underlying LoC transitions and 
introduce an interdisciplinary approach to new 
experiments.  
2 Level of Consciousness 
Consciousness is often implicitly discussed as 
thought expressed in language (Carruthers, 1996, 
2000). Even further back, in Plato's time, there was 
a general agreement that one can only speak of what 
one is consciously aware of. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to view infant language acquisition 
process from the perspective of consciousness. 
However, linguistic theories rarely touch upon 
consciousness. 
Personal Construct theory (Kelly, 1955/1991) 
defines human consciousness as undergoing both 
conscious and unconscious processes. It postulates 
that human cognition starts from unconscious 
processes, or "low levels of cognitive awareness". 
According to Zelazo (2004), children’s 
development of consciousness undergoes several 
dissociable levels before they reach full cognitive 
capability. His Viewing developmental and 
information-processing as the key features, Zelazo 
(2004) developed a hierarchically arranged LoCs 
and provided a metric for measuring the level at 
which consciousness is operating in specific 
situations. This is very different from models that 
are mainly based on adult data that distinguish 
between consciousness and a meta-level of 
consciousness (e.g., Moscovitch, 1989; Schacter, 
1989; Schooler, 2002). 
Based on Zelazo (2004) and Zelazo et al (2008)’ 
work on the development of consciousness in 
children, Gao & Holland (2008, 2013) assumed that 
language development in a newborn depends upon 
expanding consciousness and that levels of 
consciousness can also be identified. Following Gao 
& Holland, we attempt to examine mechanisms 
(behavioral traits) that generate the behaviors at 
different levels of consciousness and their relations 
to well-known transitions as the newborn develops. 
In our model, infant’s behavior is regarded not only 
simply as the output of the interaction between the 
infant and its surroundings, but also as the product 
of infant’s understanding which is confined to age-
related levels of consciousness.  
In this paper, our focus is on the preverbal period 
(0-12 months). Although children during this period 
cannot express themselves by formal language that 
we can fully understand, they are obviously able to 
show their understanding and desires by non-verbal 
means together with simple but repeated trials of 
articulation of pre-linguistic sounds. To take a 
detailed look at these features, we follow Gao & 
Holland’s (2008, 2013) definitions of the “level of 
consciousness” and make further divisions of these 
levels into more detailed sub-stages. Table 1 shows 
the “level of consciousness” sub-stages and their 
corresponding features in language development 
during a child’s first year of life.  
 
Level of 
Consciousnes
s 
LoC Stage Features relating to 
age 
LoC 0 
Unconscious 
Stage 0 
Reflective 
Reflexive crying 0;  
Throaty noises 0 
LoC 1 
Minimal 
consciousness 
Stage 1.1 
Intentionality 
Sound localization 0; 
Distinguish consonant 1;  
Distinguish vowel 3 
Stage 1.2 
Voluntary 
Action 
Voluntary crying 2; 
Coos & laugh 2 
Stage 1.3 
Repeated 
Action 
Babbling & vocal play 
4; 
Canonical babbling 6; 
LoC 2 
Recursive 
consciousness 
 
Stage 2.1 
Differential 
Labels 
Respond to name 5;  
Respond to “No” 6; 
Native preference 7;  
Segment speech 7; 
Stage 2.2 Patterned speech 10;  
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Aware of 
Relationships 
Adept to speech 
perception 11 
Stage 2.3 
Functional 
Reactions 
First words 12 
 
Table 1: The “Level of Consciousness” Stages and 
main language development features within a 
child’s first year of life 
 
From birth to the end of the first year, an infant 
goes through three levels of consciousness (See 
Table 1). The first level of consciousness 
development is LoC 0 – Unconscious, at which 
babies can only respond to stimuli unconsciously, 
without awareness of even their own actions. The 
main character of infant’s behaviours at this stage is 
reflective. Take “throaty noises” for example, they 
are the earliest vocalizations produced by infants, 
such as breathing, coughing, burping, sucking or 
sneezing. Babies make these sounds involuntarily. 
They are mainly physiological reactions that are 
partly characters of a living being in general. 
LoC 1 starts with the feature of growth that is 
labeled as the “Intentionality stage”, which is the 
first stage (stage 1.1) of LoC 2. At this stage, babies 
begin to respond to environmental stimulations. As 
the examples shown in Table 1, infants are 
gradually aware of what they hear, where the sounds 
come from (sound localization) and what are the 
differences between them (consonant and vowel 
distinctions).  “Voluntary action stage” is the second 
stage, at which infants initiate to direct their actions 
according to their desire. Therefore, the crying 
(voluntary crying) and cooing sound (coos & laugh) 
at this stage may be more related to infants’ desires 
and emotions. That is, they start to use their abilities   
as communication tools to communicate with their 
caregivers. At the third stage – “Repeated action 
stage”, babies begin to show their preference of 
repetition. This is seen as the fact that upon their 
responses to their caregivers the feedback that 
babies receive from the caregivers generates 
pleasure. This is possibly why we see 4-month-old 
babies play with vocalizations (babbling & vocal 
play) and produce repetitive syllables.   
However, all the actions under LoC 1 are 
restricted to present intero- and exteroreceptor 
stimulation (Now), which are only triggered by 
present stimuli. 
When babies start to be able to relate certain 
signals to a certain kind of meanings, they arrive at 
LoC 2 – “Recursive consciousness”. At the 
“Differential Labels” stage they are able to maintain 
the previous consciousness level and recall what 
they have acquired before. A typical observation is 
a baby’s reaction when she hears a certain syllable 
or a voice pattern. For example, when a 5-month-
old baby hears someone calls her name, which she 
must have heard for many times before, she will 
look toward the sound source (response to name), 
though she does not know yet that it is her name. 
When a baby begins to be aware of relationships, she 
is at stage 2.2. A 10-month-old infant’s use of 
protowords (patterned speech) and an 11-month-old 
infant’s understanding of others’ expressions (adept 
at speech perception) are typical developmental 
features at this stage. When a baby is around 1 year 
old, she can use words comparatively accurately 
alike adults (first words). This is the feature named 
as “Functional Reactions” shown at stage 2.3, the last 
stage of LoC 2. 
3 Agent-based Model of LoC 
The theoretical framework of agent-based model 
(ABM) proposed by Holland (1995) creates a 
flexible abstraction of the real world and provides 
an approach in the general study of complex 
adaptive systems (cas). 
ABMs consist of basic computer algorithm units, 
so-called agents, which are the central modeling 
focus points. Agents are modular or self-contained. 
An agent is an identifiable, discrete individual with 
a set of characteristics or attributes, behaviors, and 
decision-making capability. Figure 1 shows the 
structure of an individual agent in our model. We 
name it “baby-agent”. First, we will give our 
modeling assumptions with the four typical 
elements of ABMs: environment, interactions, 
behavior rules, and adaptation. Then, in the next 
section, we will describe the model in detail. 
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 Figure 1: The structure of an individual baby-agent 
interacting with its environment confined to its 
LoC.  
 
a) Environment 
For a newborn, all the things including its own 
body are unfamiliar. Trevarthen and Aitken (2001) 
distinguished three type of engagement of a human 
subject with his body and the outside world: in his 
own body, to objects, and to other persons. These 
three aspects comprise a baby-agent’s personal 
growth environment within which a baby-agent 
experiences three dimensional consciousness 
developments. The consequent accumulated 
consciousness forms a baby-agent’s thought of the 
world and serves as fodder that muses for language 
expression.  
 
b) Interactions 
Baby-agents continuously interact with their 
environment as well as with other agents. A baby-
agent is situated, or situationally dependent, in the 
sense that its behavior is based on the current state 
of its interactions with other agents and with its 
environment. 
“Other agents” is a special part of the baby-
agents’ environment. Along with the increase of 
LoC, the interaction and relationship between a 
baby-agent and other agents will be greatly 
changed. For a baby-agent with the lowest LoC, it 
has no distinctive features from other agents within 
the entire environment. It can only receive and 
respond to signals, with no awareness of their 
existence and attributes. However, a baby-agent 
with a higher LoC can realize that some agents or 
signals are special for it. As a result, it will become 
conscious of other agents’ identities as well as its 
personal connections with them, and thus begins to 
build up new protocols or mechanisms that channel 
its interactions with other agents. 
 
c) Behavior rules 
During the interaction and building up the 
relationship, a baby-agent is autonomous and self-
directed. It can function independently in its 
environment and in its interactions with other 
agents. It seems as if its individual behavior 
processes are controlled by a combination of 
heuristic and stochastic rules. In our model, we 
define the behavior rules by a set of IF/THEN rules 
that respond to external and internal signals. A 
baby-agent interacts with its environment and other 
agents through an exchange of the signals. It should 
be noted that, baby-agent’s behavior rules cannot be 
separated from its underlying level of 
consciousness. Providing the same scenario, baby-
agents at different levels of consciousness are 
expected to show different behavior rules. The term 
“level” immediately suggests a progression from 
one level to another and a type of corresponding 
dynamics. The adaptation is the power that makes 
these progressions happens. 
 
d) Adaptation 
Being adaptive is the most important character of 
the agents. That is, the agents in the model can learn 
from their environment and dynamically change 
their behaviors in response to their experience. Casti 
(1997) argues that agents should contain both base-
level rules for behavior as well as a higher-level set 
of “rules to change the rules.” The base-level rules 
provide responses to the environment, while the 
“rules to change the rules” provide adaptation. A 
baby-agent has the ability to learn and adapt its 
behaviors based on its experience, which requires 
not only memory, but also feedback and 
recirculation. Suitable feedback is very important in 
the adaptation process, which points out the right 
direction for the cultivation of a new behavior 
pattern. 
The behavior principle of the baby-agents with 
the lowest level of consciousness is quite simple. If 
a certain behavior pattern can make them feel happy 
directly, they will persevere in it and vice versa. 
This is the basis of the discovery of new rules and 
the modification of extant rules. However, as they 
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reach a higher level of consciousness, they may 
consider more about the rules. Therefore, for 
different levels of consciousness, we may have 
different behavior principles according to the 
characters of each level. In addition, the kinds of 
signals processed determine the level of 
performance under a certain rule, and thus certain 
kinds of rule conditions can be typically associated 
with the LoC involved. 
4 Model Description 
4.1 IF/THEN rules and feature database 
In our model, we will use rule-based, signal-
processing agents (Holland et al., 1986), with rules 
of the form  
 
IF (signal x is present) 
THEN (send signal y).  
 
Signals x and y could be utterances, gestures, or 
visual input. 
In the following examples, T (“teacher”, e.g. the 
mother) stands for a competent adult that regularly 
interacts with the infant L (“learner”). For example, 
a simple rule for L might be,  
 
IF (T lifts a milk bottle) 
THEN (L says “milk”). 
 
Signals can also serve to coordinate internal 
process, in which case they have no intrinsic 
meaning, serving much like the un-interpreted bit 
strings that coordinate instructions in a computer 
program. Each agent has many rules and, indeed, 
many rules can be active simultaneously (Gao & 
Holland, 2013). This simultaneous activity is 
roughly the counterpart of the simultaneous firing 
of assemblies of neurons in the central nervous 
system (Hebb, 1949).  
By collecting data from literatures in the fields of 
linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience, and 
psychology, we have built up an age-related 
development feature database. Beside the features 
of language development, we have identified other 
features. We believe that language acquisition is a 
complex process. Supports from various 
capabilities’ development are needed (Gesell, 
1928). The features arranged in different categories 
reflect the multiple dimensions of their interactions 
while the capacities of the baby-agent are being 
developed. Figure 2 shows main development 
features of the infants’ first year of life and their 
associations with each other. 
 
 
Figure 2: An illustration of some developmental 
features and their associations during infants’ first 
year of life 
 
To focus on the growth of the baby-agent, our 
model pays more attention to children’s behavior 
transitions by applying IF/THEN rules referring to 
the development feature database. Based on the 
development features, we are able to determine a set 
of IF/THEN rules. The following are some 
examples: 
  
[In the rules that follow, <action> denotes an 
overt action caused by a particular signal.]  
 
Typical rule at LoC 0 [Unconscious activities]. 
At LoC 0, baby just has inherited (‘wired in’) 
cognitive abilities. 
 
Stage 0 [Reflective – action without awareness]:  
IF (T makes a tongue protrusion) 
THEN (<L imitates the tongue 
protrusion >) 
 
Typical rule at LoC 1 [Minimal consciousness]. 
At LoC 1, baby gradually shows innate 
reinforcement of repeatable activities.  
 
Stage 1.1 [Intentionality – begin to have some 
consciousness to environmental stimulations]:  
IF (T makes a sound) 
THEN (<L turns his head towards the 
sound>) 
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Stage 1.2 [Voluntary action – direct actions 
according to one’s willing]:  
IF (L wants to be hugged by caregiver) 
THEN (<L cries voluntarily>) 
 
Stage 1.3 [Repeated action – action repetitively 
and feel happy when doing it]:  
IF (a hand is in a vision cone) 
THEN (<L waves his hand repetitively 
>) 
 
Typical rule at LoC 2 [Recursive consciousness]. 
At LoC 2, baby begins to awareness of the 
connections between object and its label. 
 
Stage 2.1 [Differential labels – begin to aware 
that some signals have special means]:  
IF (T calls L’s name) 
THEN (<L pays attention to T>) 
 
Stage 2.2 [Aware of relationships – be conscious 
of the links between signals and objects]:  
IF (T say “milk”) 
THEN (<L looks to the milk bottle>) 
 
Stage 2.3 [Action functionally – be able to use 
related signals to indicate some objects]:  
IF (a milk bottle is present) 
THEN (<L utters “milk”>) 
 
4.2 Learning Processes and Meta-Rules for 
Learning 
According to Gao & Holland (2013), to learn in this 
rule-based context, the agent must have the ability 
to modify its signal-processing rules. Such rule-
modifying, learning abilities are innate capacities 
supplied by evolution. Learning abilities can also be 
expressed as rules, functioning in a similar way as 
Hebb’s (1949) learning rule in neuro-psychology.  
Therefore, these meta-rules for learning are clearly 
distinguished from the signal-processing rules. In 
agent-based models, the meta-rules are unchanging 
and common to all agents. 
Our agent-based models described here are based 
on meta-rules that are demonstrably available to 
pre-primates. There are two general learning tasks 
that a baby-agent must be able to carry out: 
 
a) Credit-assignment 
As an agent interacts with other agents within a 
certain environment, it must be aware of the 
existence of rules and also able to decide which of 
the rules are helpful and which are detrimental. A 
mature agent must even be able to determine which 
early-acting, stage-setting rules make possible later 
beneficial outcomes. (As an example given by 
Holland (1998), consider the sacrifice of a piece in 
a game like checkers in order to make a triple jump 
later.) The credit-assignment learning process 
assigns strengths to the rules. A rule’s strength 
reflects its usefulness to the system, useful rules 
having high strengths. Rules then compete to 
control the agent. The stronger rules have a better 
chance of winning the competition. In effect, the 
rules in this system are treated as hypotheses to be 
progressively confirmed or disconfirmed. (See 
Holland, 1998, chapter 4).  
Obviously, during the credit-assignment 
procedure, recirculation and feedback are 
indispensable. The random variation and imitation 
provide a random sampling that helps uncover the 
most primitive behavior rules. When a behavior rule 
is repeatedly associated with rewarding feedback, 
such as food or a mother’s smile, it becomes a 
sampled regularity that is associated with valuable 
experience. From the sampling point of view, the 
behavior rule’s reliability is continually tested under 
the credit assignment procedure.  
 
b) Rule discovery 
Once rules have been rated by credit-assignment, 
it makes sense to replace rules that have little or no 
strength by generating new rules (hypotheses). 
Random generation of new rules is not an option 
here; that would be like trying to improve a 
computer program by inserting random instructions. 
Instead, newly generated rules must somehow be 
plausible hypotheses in terms of experience already 
accumulated. (See Holland, 1995, chapter 2). 
For the baby-agent with a higher level of 
consciousness, random variation of rules from the 
very beginning is not the best way to get the 
beneficial behavior rules. A mature baby-agent may 
have the abilities to discover new rules by 
combining building blocks (Holland, 1995, chapter 
1 ff) which are extracted from rules already 
established. An important advantage of building 
blocks is that they occur as repeated patterns in the 
ever-changing torrent of sensory input, which 
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provide repeatable experiences in a perpetually 
novel environment. 
4.3 Building blocks 
According to Holland (1998), building blocks 
(generators in mathematics) have a familiar role in 
the sciences, best exemplified by the building block 
hierarchy of the physical sciences – the quark / 
nucleon / atom / molecule / membrane /… 
hierarchy. Selected combinations of building blocks 
at one level form the building blocks of the next 
level. For a spoken language there is a similar 
phoneme / word / sentence hierarchy. A grammar 
specifies the laws that determine how words can be 
combined to yield sentences. Actually, in viewing 
the levels of consciousness, we find a similar 
hierarchy. Higher levels of consciousness in the 
LoC theory are brought about by the iterative 
reprocessing of the contents of lower levels of 
consciousness. (Zelazo et al., 2007) 
After a period of development process, a baby-
agent has acquired a certain number of behavior 
rules, which can be seen as the building blocks for 
discovering new rules. Plausible new conditions and 
rules can be generated by recombining these 
building blocks that already confirmed. A 
confirmed building block becomes a plausible 
hypothesis when combined with other similarly 
distilled building blocks. The procedure is much 
like the crossbreeding of good plants (or animals) to 
get better plants. There is a substantial literature, 
centering on genetic algorithms (Holland, 1995), 
that discuss the production of new rules in agent-
based models via the crossing of extant rules. There 
is not space here to discuss genetic algorithms in 
detail, but it is a well-established procedure.  
The building blocks amount to hypotheses at 
different levels of precision, with the rules being 
confirmed (or disconfirmed) as the agent gains 
experience. These different levels of precision may 
be related to the levels of consciousness. 
According to Gao & Holland (2013), the meta-
rules for credit assignment and rule discovery allow 
the neonate to achieve a gradual increase in control, 
corresponding to increasing LoC. The process 
begins with the acquisition of repeatable sound and 
gestures. Sounds and gestures reinforced by T 
become the building blocks that can be used when 
the baby-agent is mature. For example, producing 
various combinations of utterances at LoC 1 can be 
simply a kind of play, while they are the necessary 
building block to form meaningful utterances at 
LoC 2. Connecting optional utterances with specific 
meanings greatly reduce behavior’s ambiguity. In 
mathematical terms we refine a broad equivalence 
class into a set of smaller, more informative sub-
classes.  
In this way, selected combinations of building 
blocks at one LoC become the building blocks for 
the next level. Building blocks offer combinatoric 
possibilities: a large variety of useful or meaningful 
structures can be constructed from a small number 
of building blocks. Moving up the LoC hierarchy 
thus becomes a much more efficient process than 
trying to “establish” a monolithic rule for each 
possibility at the highest LoC. 
4.4 A Baby-agent’s consciousness properties 
By now, almost every part of the agent-based model 
has been introduced, and we come to the final topic 
of this section – the properties of consciousness. 
Actually, there are three concepts of consciousness 
involved in our model: the level of consciousness, 
the consciousness capabilities, and consciousness 
status. 
The level of consciousness and its impact on a 
baby-agent’s behavior rules have already been 
emphasized. However, consciousness development 
is a continuous process, and the increase in LoC is a 
quantum leap from the accumulation of drip growth. 
Therefore, before determining at which level of 
consciousness a baby-agent is situated, we must 
know the factors that influence the development of 
a baby’s consciousness capability. As an example, 
we focus on illustrating two main factors: time and 
training. Hereby, we give the measurement of 
consciousness capability as follows:  
 
  
Where,  is the measurement of a 
baby’s consciousness capability at time t when a 
baby-agent has been consciously trained for N 
times; f(t) and h(N) are the consciousness 
increments gained from the time factor and the 
training factor separately.  
There is no doubt that the increase of 
consciousness needs time. Ever since a baby was 
born, the internal and external environments 
provide it abundant stimulations, which promote the 
increase of its consciousness naturally. For 
( ) ( )tConsciousness f t h N 
tConsciousness
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convenience, we regard the natural increase rate 
(rate) of consciousness in our model as being 
constant, and thus the consciousness increment 
gained from the time factor can be defined as 
follows:  
 
As for the training factor, it should be much more 
complex. By denoting  as the consciousness 
increment of the i-th training, the consciousness 
increment gained from the training factor can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
Where, i stands for the i-th training; N is the total 
training times by time t;  and  
respectively indicate the feedback that the baby-
agent receives and the consciousness status that 
baby-agent is situated in the i-th training.  
The impact of the feedback on the learning 
process has been described. We now come to take a 
look at the consciousness status. It should be noted 
that, for a baby-agent whose consciousness 
capability can reach LoC 3, it doesn’t mean that it 
remains situated at LoC 3. Actually, it will normally 
stay at a lower level of consciousness, and will 
elevate its own consciousness status to deal with 
specific requirement when needed. Just as we will 
achieve different scores if we bear different 
attitudes in exams, a baby-agent with a different 
consciousness status will have different amount of 
consciousness increase as well. 
Given different parameters, we can model 
various development paths of baby-agents. By 
calibrating age-related development features 
according to the consciousness capabilities’ 
increased integrally in a baby-agent, we can 
determine the consciousness condition of each 
behavior rule. This kind of treatment makes sense. 
Gao & Holland’s (2013) framework makes it 
possible to observe an infant’s language 
development in relation to the increase of levels of 
consciousness in specific situations. In principle, 
this approach takes the development of language as 
well as the growth of consciousness capabilities in 
an infant as being supported by diversified factors 
in reasonable environments.  
5 Summary  
This study proposes a rule-based, signal-processing 
agent-based model to reveal the dynamics of 
language development in early infants. This model 
shows how a newborn discovers behavior rules and 
improves its autonomy. With the establishment of 
such a model, we are able to explore the 
mechanisms that support language development and 
understand how language is acquired, used, and 
changes over time. 
By building up the model, we are able to see that 
the influence of consciousness on language 
development is manifold. During the learning 
processes, it is very important to identify a role for 
interaction, without which it will be impossible for 
infants to develop a sense of learning. However, the 
impact of interaction on language development is 
limited by levels of consciousness. Infants cannot 
acquire the contents beyond the limit of LoC at a 
given age. That is, when consciousness does not 
exist or does not reach a certain level, a learning 
process cannot be activated in an infant. In addition, 
different learning procedures occur at different 
levels of consciousness. What infants acquire at a 
lower LoC will become the building blocks for a 
higher LoC, which is the reason why an infant at a 
higher LoC can acquire more complex rules for 
learning more quickly. 
What is presented in this paper is only the 
description of a step toward building up 
experimentally executable versions of models. The 
present model setting described is seemingly simple. 
In the future work, such models will be further 
established to allow multiple agents to interact with 
each other at different levels of consciousness, 
suggesting that each agent will develop its own 
idiolect and that the agents that interact regularly 
with each other will have many common 
constructions in their idiolects. 
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